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Abstract
The sectoral allocation of labor diﬀers considerably across developed economies,
even in the presence of similar patterns of structural change. A general equilibrium
model that captures the stylized facts of structural change is presented. In this
framework, economy-wide barriers to entry hinder the development of dynamic sec-
tors such as service industries. Moreover, higher service prices and rents in regulated
economies reduce labor supply, providing a rationale for the negative association be-
tween product market regulations and the employment rate previously found in the
literature. Empirical evidence presented shows that regulatory entry barriers help
explaining diﬀerences in the sectoral allocation of labor across OECD countries.
JEL Classiﬁcation: O11, O41, L5.
Keywords: Unbalanced Growth, Entry Regulations.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Service industries have absorbed a continuously increasing share of the labour force dur-
ing the last century in developed countries, while agricultural activities have lost weight
dramatically. This process structural change has led researchers to establish the positive
(negative) association between the service (agricultural) employment share and GDP per
capita as a stylized fact of modern economic growth.1 However, remarkable diﬀerences
in the sectoral distribution of employment can still be observed across countries at a
similar stage of development. For instance, some European countries such as Austria,
Italy and Germany have service employment shares barely exceeding 60 per cent in the
second half of the 1990s, 10 percentage points lower than in the Netherlands, Australia
or Canada.
Echevarria (1997) and Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001) develop general equilibrium
models consistent with the long-run patterns of structural change. These papers rely on
demand (non-homothetic preferences) and supply (diﬀerences in the rate of productivity
growth across sectors) forces to explain the long-run patterns in the sectoral allocation
of resources. This paper considers these two forces as engines of sectoral reallocation,
but focuses on their interaction with regulations that raise barriers to entry in explaining
persistent cross-country diﬀerences in the sectoral structure.
Economy-wide regulations such as screening procedures and tax-related requirements
for start-ups and sectoral regulations such as zoning laws or restrictions on shop opening
hours constitute barriers to entry for entrepreneurs. Recent studies focus on the eﬀects
of diﬀerent aspects of product market regulations in labour market outcomes. At the
cross-country level, the stringency of entry regulations appears negatively associated
with employment rates (Nicoletti et al., 2001) and entrepreneurial activity (Fonseca et
al., 2001) across OECD countries. At the sectoral level, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002)
ﬁnd that entry regulation hinders job creation in the French retail sector.
The model described herein captures the long-term patterns of structural change:
(1) an increase (reduction) in the services (agricultural) sectoral labour share along the
growth process; (2) a similar pattern with regard to nominal GDP shares; (3) a less
marked increase in the real GDP share of the service sector; (4) a continuous decline of
the employment rate associated with the secular fall of employment engaged in agricul-
tural activities. In the presence of economy-wide entry regulations, the market price of
services and rents in the economy increase, triggering a reduction of labour supply. This
provides a rationale for the negative association between product market regulations and
1Clark (1957) and Kuznets (1966) study the relationship between sectoral structure and economic
growth. For a recent review of the empirical regularities in the growth of service employment see OECD
(2000)
2the employment rate previously found in the literature, and is also consistent with the
gap in marketization of services activities between the US and European economies found
in Freeman and Schettkat (2002). Accordingly, European households would respond to
tighter entry regulations substituting the purchase of services in the market (e.g. child
care, home repairs and leisure activities) by home production, while the Americans, fac-
ing lower service prices would supply more hours of work purchasing equivalent services
in the market.
The simulations show that economy-wide regulatory barriers to entry obstruct the
natural pattern of structural change, hindering the development of those sectors whose
demand is income elastic. Thus, countries with tighter restrictions to entry are expected
to have a relatively underdeveloped service sector. Empirical evidence presented in the
paper supports this negative association, which persists even after controlling for a wide
range of factors which might also contribute to shape cross-country diﬀerences in the
sectoral structure.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the cross-country
patterns in the sectoral allocation of labour and presents suggestive evidence on the
role of entry barriers in the sectoral allocation of employment. In Section 3, the model
of structural change is outlined. Section 4 presents the main results of the free entry
version of the model and Section 5 discusses the eﬀects of the interactions between entry
regulations and the forces of structural change in shaping employment patterns. Section
6 assesses the empirical relevance of the relationship between entry regulations and the
service employment share and Section 7 concludes.
2 Structural Change and Entry Regulations
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 1 shows the distribution of the US employment shares in the
three main sectors of the economy (agriculture, manufacturing and services) over the
last 130 years. It shows a progressive fall in the agricultural share (from 47% in 1870 to
2% in 1996) that goes together with a continuous increase of service employment (from
26 to 70% in the same period).
This pattern of structural change is not a peculiarity of the US, but rather, a common
feature across OECD countries. This is illustrated in panels 2 and 3 of Figure 1, which
show a positive (negative) cross-sectional correlation between GDP per capita and the
service (agriculture) employment share in the 1990s. However, these cross-plots also
show important disparities in the snapshot distribution of employment across similar
countries. For instance, Italy, Austria, Germany and Japan are relatively underdeveloped
in terms of service employment with respect to countries like the Netherlands, Australia
or Canada, while all of them lie in a similar income per capita range.











































































































































































































Figure 1: Structural Change and Employment Sectoral Allocation
Two main forces lie behind the process of structural change: (1) a hierarchy in
consumer tastes and (2) diﬀerences in the rate of growth of technical change between
sectors.2
The ﬁrst is associated with Engel’s law, that is, with diﬀerences in income elasticities
of demand for diﬀerent goods. The Engel’s law predicts a progressive fall in the demand
for agricultural products as income per capita raises due to a saturation level in agri-
cultural consumption. Clark (1957) argues that a similar argument applies to service
demand, which beneﬁts from a saturation in the consumption of manufacturing goods
once a certain level of development is reached. Empirical evidence on the income elastic-
ity of demand for agricultural products clearly suggests that saturation levels have been
surpassed in all OECD countries. Regarding the service sector, the evidence is less clear-
cut, with estimates yielding income elasticities either equal to one (Falvey and Gemmell,
1996) or slightly larger than 1 (Bergstrand, 1991). However, problems of measurement
2There are other forces which to some extent will alter the sectoral structure of the economy along
the growth process. Among them, the outsourcing of ancillary activities to specialized service providers
is becoming common practice in the manufacturing sector. Although the rationales and consequences of
outsourcing are beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that in the process of externalization
barriers to entry are likely to be important, since more stringent regulatory and administrative barriers
might obstruct the creation of the ﬂexible producer service ﬁrms that are at the core of the outsourcing
process.
4cast serious doubts on the accuracy of service output data (Gordon, 1996). If output
in some service industries such as retail, wholesale trade, ﬁnance, real estate or social
services is systematically mis-measured (Griliches, 1994), then estimates of the income
elasticity of demand for services would be downward biased.
The second explanation, ﬁrst put forward in Baumol (1967), highlights supply side
forces. Assuming that labour productivity grows more slowly in services than in industry,
and that the ratio of real output between both sectors is held constant, “more and more
of the total labour force must be transferred to the non-progressive sector (services) and
the amount of labour in the other sector will tend to approach zero”.3 Accepting the
caveat that problems of measurement might be attributing real output growth to an
increase in the relative price of services, evidence on a slower growth rate in service than
in manufacturing “measured” productivity is overwhelming.4
Product and labour market institutions should inﬂuence the process of structural
change, either facilitating or obstructing the reallocation of resources. However, their
role has been largely ignored in this literature.5 On the labour market side of the
regulatory framework, Gordon (1997) suggests that relatively high minimum wages in
France could be obstructing the creation of low-wage service industries employment in
this country. Along these lines, Freeman and Schettkat (2000) ﬁnd some evidence of wage
compression obstructing the expansion of low skilled services in Germany, although the
presence of wage ﬂoors is able to account for a minor share of the service employment
gap of this country with respect to the US.
Figure 2 assesses the relationship between the regulation of entry and the sectoral
employment shares across OECD countries. It shows the association between the average
sectoral employment shares in the 1990s and the cost of setting up a new business across
OECD countries.6 The graphs on the left hand side show a clear negative (positive)
association between the service (agricultural and manufacturing) employment share and
the indicator of entry restrictions. The correlations are clearly signiﬁcant, ranging from
-.75 in the case of services to .52 with respect to agriculture. Similarly, the partial
correlations results (after controlling for GDP per capita) presented on the right hand
3Baumol (1967)
4See for instance Gouyette and Perelman (1997) and the references therein.
5An exception is Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986), who mention that institutions that set up
barriers to the free movement of factors from low to high productivity growth sectors might be a potential
source of slower growth and structural slump.
6The cost of setting up a new business comprises the fees from the diﬀerent permits and legal re-
quirements and the imputed opportunity cost of the entrepreneur’s time needed to deal with this process
normalized by GDP per capita. For details on the construction of this indicator see Djankov et al. (2002).
Althought there is information available on a larger number of countries, the graphs are restricted to
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Figure 2: Entry Regulations and Sectoral Employment Shares
6panels suggest that these correlations are not due to an association between GDP per
capita and the indicator of entry restrictions. Before further discussing the empirical
association between entry regulations and the sectoral shares, next section presents a
model that spells out the channels through which barriers to entry alter the sectoral
allocation of resources in the process of structural change.
3 The Model
In this economy, structural change is brought about by diﬀerent income elasticities of de-
mand for every good and diﬀerent exogenous rates of productivity growth across sectors
as in Echevarria (1997) and Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (2001). There are three sectors:
agriculture (a) manufacturing (m) and services (s), each characterized by a continuum of
ﬁrms (na,n m,n s) producing diﬀerentiated brands. Product markets are monopolistically
competitive,7 and entry is restricted due to the existence of regulatory barriers. Thus,
the proﬁt function of the a representative ﬁrm i in sector r can be deﬁned as follows:
πirt = PirtCirt − WtLirt − κ , for r = a,m,s (1)
where PirtCirt and WtLirt are gross output and the wage bill respectively, and κ accounts
for barriers to entry. In this setting, entry barriers represent an economy-wide ﬁxed
cost of setting up a business that must be paid in every period.8 This speciﬁcation is
a reasonable approximation to administrative burdens for corporations, price controls
or regulatory and administrative opacities in general which represent yearly costs to
incumbent ﬁrms. Instead, barriers to entry such as licenses and permits represent a
sunk cost. In this case, κ should be interpreted as the annuity payment of those costs.
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) model this aspect of the regulations in product markets
in a similar fashion, considering entry barriers to be proportional to the size of the ﬁrm
(or ﬁrm’s output). In this model instead, the cost of regulations is equal for all ﬁrms
independently of the productive sector in which they operate.
7Brunello (1993) incorporates monopolistic competition in product markets and wage bargaining
institutions in the unbalanced growth model proposed by Baumol. I diﬀer from him in two fundamental
aspects: by allowing for non-homotheticity of preferences and assuming that free entry determines the
equilibrium number of ﬁrms in each period.
8Alternatively, Messina (2003) considers barriers to entry proportional to sectoral prices. The main
results of the paper are not altered by this modiﬁcation.
73.1 Households
The representative household is the owner of the ﬁrms and labour supply decisions are
made together with consumption. The household utility function is
Ut =
³¡
Cat − ¯ A
¢α (Cmt)
β ¡
Cst + ¯ S
¢1−α−β´φ ¡¯ L − Lt
¢1−φ (2)
where Cat,C mt and Cst are composite bundles that represent the total amount of agri-
cultural, manufacturing and service goods consumed at time t. The parameter ¯ A is a
subsistence level of agricultural goods, implying that the poorer the household is, the
more of its income must be devoted to the consumption of food. In other words, given
¯ A>0 the income elasticity of agricultural demand is lower than 1. On the other hand,
¯ S can be interpreted as home production of service activities such as cooking, cleaning
or home repairs, to name but a few, accounting for the assumption that as GDP grows
there is a progressive monetization of these activities.9 Thus, given ¯ S>0 the income
elasticity of demand for services is always greater than 1. The second term of the utility
function represents leisure, ¯ L being the household endowment of hours.
In every period, nrt varieties are produced in each sector. The household divides its
















; for r = a,m,s (3)
where σr > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among varieties in sector r.I f o l l o w
the original setup proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1975), assuming that the number of
varieties of each composite good enters explicitly the utility function up to an arbitrary
power (ξr). Therefore, this speciﬁcation encompasses several speciﬁcations that have
been used in the literature. For instance, by setting ξr = 1
1−σr , taste for variety is
cancelled as in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), while ξr =0is the functional form
preferred by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
Two-stage budgeting is a valid procedure since homogeneous separability applies.
Therefore, the household will choose in a ﬁrst stage the quantities to consume out of every
brand taking sectoral expenditures as given, and later select the aggregate consumption
9Another secular trend is the progressive substitution of some of these services by goods that carry
out similar functions. For instance, washing machines instead of cleaning services or CD players instead
of live concerts. The decision between purchasing these services in the market or substituting them by
manufacturing goods will depend, among other factors, on the evolution of relative prices. Therefore,
the stringency of entry regulations will have an important role in this process as will be discussed later.
8bundles and labour supply. In particular, every household will repeat for every sector
the maximization of (3) subject to
nrt X
i=1
PirtCirt = PrtCrt , for r = a,m,s
This yields the demand for each variety, which is inversely related to its relative price







ξr(σr−1) , for r = a,m,s (4)










, for r = a,m,s (5)
In the second stage, sectoral expenditures and labour supply are decided. Therefore,
the household maximizes its utility function (2) subject to the budget constraint and
non-negativity conditions
PatCat + PmtCmt + PstCst ≤ WtLt + Rt (6)
Cat ≥ 0,C mt ≥ 0,C st ≥ 0
where the right-hand side of the ﬁrst inequality represents total income of the household,
















1 − α − β
Pst
It − ¯ S (10)
where It is the so called full income of the household:
It = WtLt + Rt + Pst ¯ S − Pat ¯ A (11)
9, and the individual labour supply schedule








φ representing the ratio between the elasticities of the marginal utilities of
leisure and consumption.
3.2 Price Rules
Technology is the same across sectors and ﬁrms, but the exogenous rate of productivity
growth gr is allowed to vary across sectors according to the following law of motion
˙ λrt = grλrt , for r = a,m,s (13)
where λrt is the productivity level at time t in sector r and a dot over a variable denotes
a derivative with respect to time.
The production function of a representative ﬁrm i that operates in sector r is char-
acterized by
Oirt = Lirtλrt − ψr , for r = a,m,s (14)
where the parameter ψr represents a ﬁxed cost of production that is allowed in principle
to vary across sectors and Oirt is the output of ﬁrm i in a given period.
Taking into account the demand for each particular brand and the available technol-
ogy, the monopolistic ﬁrms set prices and labour demand to maximize proﬁts. We assume
that the number of ﬁrms (and therefore brands) is so large that every ﬁrm neglects the
indirect eﬀects of its price decisions on aggregate variables. The goods produced are
non-storable.
Proﬁt maximization of ﬁrm’s i proﬁts (1) subject to its demand (4) and supply









, for r = a,m,s
is the markup of prices over marginal costs.








ξr(σr−1) Crt + ψr
´
λrt
, for r = a,m,s (16)
103.3 Equilibrium
Note that in the light of the assumptions made about technology and preferences, the
inter-brand equilibrium will be symmetrical:
Pjrt = Pkrt ∀ j,k ,f o rr = a,m,s
Symmetry allows us to work with aggregate variables. Thus, according to (5) the






Pirt ,f o rr = a,m,s (17)
which implies that, as long as taste for variety is not cancelled
³




prices decrease when the number of varieties in the sector increases. Introducing (17)









,f o rr = a,m,s (18)







t ,f o r r = a,m,s (19)













,f o rr = a,m,s (20)
The labour market clearing condition is derived from individual labour supply (12)
and the sectoral labour demands summarized in (20):
Lat + Lmt + Lst = Lt = φ¯ L − (1 − φ)
¡




Finally, an expression for the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in every sector closes the
m o d e l .Ia s s u m ef r e ee n t r yo n c et h er e g u l a t o r yc o s t sa r es a t i s ﬁed. Thus, combining (1),
(18) and (19), the zero proﬁt condition and market clearing set the number of varieties
in every sector according to the next expression








=0 for r = a,m,s (22)
The Equilibrium is deﬁned by the three demand rules (8), (9), (10), the three price
rules and labour demand equations summarized in (18) and (20) respectively, the three
zero proﬁt conditions summarized in (22) and the labour market clearing condition (21),
which constitute a system of 13 equations in 13 unknowns. Labour is set as the numeraire,
such that aggregate wages are equal to 1. Non linearities in the system oblige to ﬁnd
numerical solutions by an iterative process.
113.4 Parameterization
All parameters are set in advance to match certain long-run averages observed in the
US economy of the last century. Thus, a model period corresponds to one year and is
simulated for 100 periods.
Table 1 summarizes the parameters used in the benchmark simulations. The expendi-
ture shares (α,β) represent the actual sectoral value added as a percentage of GDP in the
US in 2000. ¯ A and ¯ S are set together with the initial levels of technology (ga0,g m0,g s0)
in order to obtain an income elasticity of demand for every good consistent with empir-
ical estimates. Accordingly, the average income elasticity of service demand in a mature
economy (during the last 20 periods of the simulation) is 1.1, consistent with available
estimates for the 1980s (Bergstrand, 1991). Over the whole period, the income elasticity
of demand for services is larger than one, and decreases monotonically as productivity
increases. Consistent with the empirical evidence, the income elasticity for manufactures
is smaller than for services but larger than for agriculture.
Oliveira, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) ﬁnd an average mark-up of 1.15 for US man-
ufacturing, while estimates for service sub-sectors range from 1.24 to 1.68. I introduce
the same markups in the three sectors in the benchmark simulation to isolate the eﬀects
of entry regulations on the sectoral structure. Therefore, the elasticity of substitution
across brands in every sector is set to 6, which implies a markup of 1.2.
The value of φ is set to 1/3 such that in the absence of entry regulations and income
eﬀects due to non-homothetic preferences the representative household would work a
third of its time endowment. The ﬁxed costs of production in every sector and time
endowment of the household are normalized to 1.
The growth rates of sectoral productivity (ga,g m,g s) are calculated using data de-
scribed in Broadberry (1998). This data represent yearly average annual growth rates of
output per employee in the three main sectors of the US economy for the period 1900-
1990.10 According to these estimates, service productivity growth lags behind the other
two sectors as put forward by Baumol’s cost-disease model.
The degree of taste for variety (ξr) is set to zero in all sectors. Therefore, as in Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977) variety is neither a public good nor a bad. Finally, κ is set to 0.005,
implying that when entry regulations are present rents account for 12% of annual GDP
in a mature economy.
10The service sector productivity growth rate is a weighted average of Distribution, Transport and
Communications, Utilities, Finance and Other Services rates of productivity growth. Government Ser-
vices are left out of the analysis, since output measurement rules out the possibility of productivity
growth in this sector.
12Table 1:
Parameters in the Baseline Model
ga0 gm0 gs0 α β ¯ A ¯ S φ L θ
1000 200 300 0.02 0.025 260 50 1/3 1 6
ξ ga gm gs µa µm µs ψa ψm ψs
0 0.034 0.022 0.011 1.2 1.2 1.2 1 1 1
4 Long-Run. The Free Entry Case
Let us ﬁrst concentrate on the dynamics of the model in the long run free entry case;
thus, when barriers to entry are absent (κ =0in eq. (22)). Figure 3 shows the simu-
lated evolution of the real and nominal sectoral GDP shares, sectoral employment shares
and employment rate for a period of 100 years. First, note that the sectoral employ-
ment shares follow a remarkably similar pattern to the one observed in the US economy
during the last century (reported in Figure 1). A massive reallocation of employment
from agricultural to service industries takes place, while the manufacturing employment
share stays relatively constant. In early stages of production (when productivity is low),
the subsistence level of agricultural consumption requires a large share of employment
engaged in this sector. However, the important growth rate of productivity in the agricul-
tural sector frees up so much employment that initially both manufacturing and service
employment shares increase. This pattern remains stable during the ﬁrst 50 years of the
simulation. Afterwards, the income elastic demand for services together with the low
rate of productivity growth in this sector brings about a continuously increasing share
of services in employment and nominal GDP, which starts drawing resources even from
the manufacturing sector.
Even if the service share increases in nominal terms, following the same pattern of
the employment shares, the eﬀects of the productivity gap can be observed from the
evolution of the real GDP shares.11 As income rises, the gap between productivity
in manufacturing and services grows, and consequently the relative price of services
increase with respect to manufacturing. Thus, given the constant raise of the relative
price of services, the evolution of the real GDP shares illustrates the so-called cost-disease
evolution of the service sector, which suggests that a non-negligible part of the expansion
of services nominal GDP shares is due to this price diﬀerential.
11Real GDP shares are deﬁned as sectoral output evaluated at prices in period 80 divided by real

















































Figure 3: Long-run. Free Entry Case
The evolution of the employment rate can be easily understood from the market
clearing condition in the labour market (21) which, taking into account that in the free
entry case rents are zero (Rt =0 )becomes :
Lt = φ¯ L − (1 − φ)
Pst ¯ S − Pat ¯ A
Wt
(23)
Therefore, if preferences were homothetic
¡ ¯ A = ¯ S =0
¢
, the second term in this equa-
tion would be zero and the employment level would be ﬁxed over time at φ¯ L (horizontal
line in the graph). In our case, productivity improvements reduce prices and therefore
the relative importance of this second term as time evolves, which implies that structural
change progressively faints and the employment rate tends to this value in the long run.
However, along the structural change path the same forces that explain the sectoral
labour shares drive the evolution of labour supply. At early stages of development (small
t) the need to fulﬁll the subsistence level of agriculture consumption together with a low
labour productivity in the three sectors explains that the hours worked are above φ¯ L.A s
income grows, the household progressively reduce its working hours, since productivity
growth means that the subsistence level of food consumption can be reached with fewer
14hours of work. This decline in per capita hours worked coincides with the shift away from
employment engaged in agricultural production, as observed in the early decades of the
twentieth century in the US (Costa, 1994). At some point, the value of home production
of services equals the agricultural subsistence requirement, and the employment rate
crosses the long-run equilibrium level of leisure. Finally, the continuous reduction of
service prices implies a fall in the relative value of home production with respect to
market purchase of services that explains the rise in labour supply.
5 Entry Regulations and Structural Change
Last section showed that the model can capture the stylized facts of structural change.
However, non-homotheticity of preferences and diﬀerent sectoral productivity growth
rates are not enough to explain cross-country variability of sectoral labour shares as
long as preferences and technology are similar across a pool of relatively homogenous
countries.
In the next simulation, we introduce entry regulations and study their eﬀects on the
sectoral allocation of labour. Since the empirical motivation of this paper is to explain
the divergence in the sectoral employment rates across mature economies, the time span
of the next simulation is limited to the last 20 years.



























Figure 4: Employment Shares and Working Hours in a Mature Economy
15Figure 4 shows the employment rate and sectoral labour shares for the unrestricted
entry model (straight lines) and the regulated model (dashed lines). The comparison of
the employment rates in the regulated and free entry economies clearly shows that more
stringent regulatory barriers reduce labour supply. The intuition behind this result is
quite simple. Total diﬀerentiation of (21) yields:
d(Lt)
dκ












The ﬁrst term in the second parenthesis is positive, indicating that barriers to entry
reduce labour supply directly (recall that φ < 1), through the raise in the size of the rents
in the economy. The other two terms show that entry barriers alter labour supply through
changes in the value of the subsistence requirements. Since tighter entry restrictions
reduce the number of ﬁrms in equilibrium, the prices of agricultural and service products





in the presence of barriers to entry acts as an income eﬀect that further reduces
labour supply. This is partially oﬀset by the increasing cost of the subsistent requirement
of food (third term). However, this is a second order eﬀect in relatively wealthy societies,
where the consumption expenditure in agricultural products is very modest and the fast
productivity experienced in this sector guarantees a low relative price for food. Thus,
the ﬁrst two eﬀects outweigh the latter and labour supply falls in regulated economies.12
Nicoletti et al. (2001) ﬁnd a negative correlation between product market regulations
and the employment rate in a cross-country study for OECD economies. While they
discuss several demand-side channels that could drive this ﬁnding, the model presented
here proposes an alternative explanation. As barriers to entry become more stringent,
the reduction of varieties increases rents and service prices and favor home production of
service activities against their purchase in the market, reducing labour supply. Similarly,
Freeman and Schettkat (2002) ﬁnd that once home production of services is accounted
for, there are no sizable diﬀerences in the employment rate between the US and Germany.
As the authors put forward, diﬀerences in the tax wedge and skills distributions between
both countries partly explain the gap. Additionally, according to the insights discussed
above the lower labour supply of German households might be the response to more
stringent entry regulations (and therefore higher service prices).13
The ﬁrst three panels of Figure 4 show the responses of the sectoral employment
shares to the presence of regulatory barriers. They show that economy-wide barriers to
entry exert asymmetric eﬀects on the productive structure of an economy characterized
12Alternative simulations where barriers to entry represent a dead-weight loss show that these institu-
tions reduce the employment rate in a mature economy even in the absence of rents.
13Our indices of barriers to entry indicate highly unregulated markets in the US while German obstacles
to the creation of new ﬁrms appear in the mean of the distribution of countries.
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Figure 5: Barriers to Entry and Aggregate Outcomes. Diﬀerences (in percentage points)
with Respect to the Free Entry Case.
by structural change. They reduce the labour engaged in service activities, increasing
the sectoral labour shares of manufacturing and agriculture.
The rationale behind this result is the following. First, entry regulations reduce
the number of ﬁrms and increase prices of all goods. Since service demand is income
elastic, as long as the introduction of entry restrictions reduces real income this will
cause a reduction in consumption that is stronger for the service sector.14 Second, the
higher market price of services and larger size of rents in the regulated economy triggers
an additional income eﬀect via reduction of labour supply which constrains further the
service employment share.
Although in the present parameterization entry regulations are always welfare de-
14Note that the reduction in real income will not always take place. The reduction of varieties intro-
duced by the presence of entry regulations increases sectoral prices but also saves ﬁxed costs of production.
As Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) showed, when ξ =0the market outcome is equal to the second best social
optimum in which lump-sum subsidies are not available to overcome the ineﬃciency introduced by mo-
nopolistic competition. Thus, any restriction to the number of varieties will reduce income and welfare.
However, if variety is considered a public bad (ξ < 0), the output and welfare consequences of restricting
the number of varieties is undetermined. Messina (2003) shows that the results presented here hold in
a similar framework even if variety is considered a public bad, as long as entry regulations are welfare
decreasing.
17creasing (see footnote 14), it is useful to measure how important these welfare losses are.
Let us deﬁne ϑ as the percentage variation in leisure that an individual in a regulated
economy has to experience to be as well oﬀ as in the free entry case, leaving consumption
constant. If superscripts r denote variables in the regulated equilibrium and superscripts




























Figure 5 shows a monotonic relation between κ and the compensating variation in
leisure. It also plots the diﬀerentials between the regulated and the free entry benchmark
economies in the employment rate and the service share. These results highlight the
relative importance of regulatory barriers to entry, predicting welfare losses of almost
10% with respect of the free entry case and sizable reductions of the service share and
t h ee m p l o y m e n tr a t ew h e nt h es i z eo fr e n t sr e p r e s e n t1 0 %o fG D P .F i n a l l y ,n o t et h a t
we have assumed economy-wide barriers to entry. To the extent that in reality barriers
to entry are concentrated in service industries, their eﬀects on the employment rate and
service employment share will be underestimated in the simulations presented here.
6 Service Employment Share and Entry Regulations
This section investigates the association between barriers to entry and the service em-
ployment share from an empirical perspective. The model presented in the previous
sections leads to the following reduced-form speciﬁcation:
Ljt = α0 + β1Yjt + β2Zjt + γRj + εjt for j =1 ,2...n and t =1 ,2...Ti (26)
where Ljt denotes the service employment share in country j and period t, Yjt represents
GDP per capita and its square, Zjt is a set of control variables and Rj denotes the
diﬀerent time-invariant indicators of barriers to entry. Consistent with the predictions
of the model, the main hypothesis to be tested is γ < 0. Three indicators of entry
regulations are taken from Djankov et al. (2002), who collected information on the
regulation of entry by start-up companies in 1999. These include the time devoted
to obtain all the necessary permits and to notify and ﬁle with all requisite authorities
(Time in the tables), and the oﬃcial costs (Cost) of this process (normalized by GDP
per capita). The third variable measures “full costs” (Time/Cost), adding to the oﬃcial
costs the imputed opportunity cost of the entrepreneur’s time. Data limitations on
entry regulations require the assumption of constancy of the regulatory environment
throughout the period. Although some institutional changes in product markets took
18place within the period, this is unlikely to be an unreasonable assumption given the
strong inertia of institutions.15
Table 2:
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max Obs Countries
Service Empl Sh. 59.69 9.09 33.43 73.83 98 18
GDP per head 12.17 6.49 2.22 27.96 98 18
Government Consumption 17.89 4.37 8.19 27.96 98 18
Investment Rate 22.07 4.12 14.67 35.01 98 18
Urbanization 75.62 13.51 28.4 97 98 18
Secondary Education 93.96 18.42 43.2 145.5 98 18
Union Density 0.424 0.191 0.09 0.90 98 18
EPL 1.11 0.575 0.10 2 98 18
Coordination 2.03 0.626 1 3 98 18
Time 27.04 25.40 2 82 98 18
Cost 0.102 0.080 0.005 0.273 98 18
Cost/Time 0.199 0.175 0.017 0.501 98 18
Entry restrictions are not the only factor behind cross-country diﬀerences in the
relative development of the service sector. Zjt contains a set of time-varying variables
that aim to capture these additional factors, which are extensively reviewed in Messina
(2002) and summarized in the following three groups:
Exogenous demand shifts. These include the relative size of the public sector, the
investment rate and the degree of urbanization. Regarding the former, the government
is not only a consumer but also an important supplier of services. To the extent that the
supply of public services outweighs private demand, countries with larger public sectors
are expected to have a larger service employment share. On the contrary, if investment is
intensive in manufacturing goods as Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1999) suggest, countries
with higher investment rates are expected to have a relatively underdeveloped service
sector. The urbanization rate (measured as the share of urban population in the total
15Studies focusing on the eﬀects of labour market institutions have found very persistent idiosyncratic
factors which might explain the better performance of time invariant institutional measures over time
varying indicators in cross-country regressions (e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).
19population) accounts for exogenous demand shifts associated with the development of
urban cultures, such as the expansion of leisure related services.
Labour market institutions. Unions might interfere in the process of structural change
by obstructing the reallocation of resources from shrinking to expanding sectors, reducing
the size of the service sector. Similarly, wage ﬂoors and wage compression are expected
to cut back jobs in the lower extreme of the wage distribution. To the extent that these
jobs are more important in some service sub-sectors (e.g. restaurants and retail) than
in the rest of the economy these institutions are expected to reduce the share of service
employment. The regressions include union density rates and the degree of coordination
of wage-setting institutions, this last factor being previously found a signiﬁcant predictor
of wage compression across OECD countries (OECD, 1999). As in the case of entry
regulations and unions, ﬁring and hiring costs are expected to diﬃcult the reallocation
of resources and consequently impact negatively on the development of the service sector.
Thus, an indicator of the strictness of employment protection legislation is included.
Trade specialization. Saegler (1997) tests the role of human capital endowments in
the sectoral allocation of labour, ﬁnding that OECD countries with a more educated
labour force tend to have a lower share of manufacturing employment. This is consistent
with a pattern of trade specialization in which countries with a larger endowment of
human capital specialize in the production of human capital intensive goods (such as
most tradable services). Other sources of comparative advantage that might induce
trade specialization such as the availability of natural resources might aﬀect the sectoral
distribution of employment. However, experimentation with some of these variables
yielded non-statistically signiﬁcant results.
The dataset covers the period 1970-1997 for 18 OECD countries, which is the max-
imum amount of countries for which a complete set of information is available.16 Five
year averages are constructed to minimize the impact of business cycle ﬂuctuations.17
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the data.
In the presence of country unobserved heterogeneity, OLS standard errors of the
parameters in eq. (26) are invalid. Thus, I assume that this unobservable time-invariant
characteristics are random and estimate the model following FGLS.18 Table 3 presents
16The service employment share (ISIC 6 to 9), GDP per head at current prices and PPP exchange
rates and Government Consumption share over GDP are from the OECD Statistical Compendium (1999).
The Investment rate (Gross investment/GDP), Ubanization rate (urban population as percentage of total
population), Secondary enrollment rate (% gross) are from the World Development Indicators (1999).
The EPL indicators, union density rates and coordination indices are from Nickell and Nunziata (2001).
17The data are collapsed in ﬁve periods covering ﬁve-year intervals: 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 1980-1984,
1985-1989, 1990-1994 and one period of three years: 1995-1997.
18A strong assumption of the random eﬀects model is the absence of correlation between the country
20Table 3: Determinants of Service Employment Share in 18 OECD Countries. Random
Eﬀects Estimation(1)
Dep. Var Service Employment Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 32.282 0.000 30.032 45.732 27.881 38.882
(5.07) (0.0) (4.59) (6.09) (4.58) (5.92)
GDP/h 1.359 0.672 1.357 0.578 1.350 0.899
(9.18) (1.78) (9.07) (1.57) (9.05) (2.20)
(GDP/h)2 -0.027 -0.024 -0.027 -0.023 -0.027 -0.027
(-5.73) (-2.64) (-5.68) (-2.65) (-5.64) (-2.68)
Gov. Cons. Share 0.558 0.592 0.539 0.580 0.557 0.570
(4.52) (5.07) (4.23) (4.84) (4.43) (4.63)
Investment Rate -0.103 -0.061 -0.114 -0.070 -0.091 -0.050
(-1.10) (-0.70) (-1.19) (-0.82) (-0.96) (-0.53)
Urbanization 0.123 0.155 0.159 0.20 0.167 0.195
(2.05) (2.87) (2.69) (3.52) (2.92) (4.04)
Secondary Enrol. 0.059 0.016 0.056 0.010 0.060 0.026
(3.32) (0.81) (3.14) (0.50) (3.33) (1.16)
EPL -1.042 -1.029 -0.990 -0.886 -1.377 -1.552
(-1.05) (-1.13) (-0.93) (-0.93) (-1.40) (-1.68)
Union Density -8.583 -7.355 -8.398 -6.775 -7.548 -5.783
(-3.09) (-2.84) (-2.97) (-2.60) (-2.70) (-2.16)
Coordination 0.710 0.662 0.418 0.483 0.842 0.580
(1.02) (0.99) (0.60) (0.73) (1.17) (0.81)
Cost/Time -16.859 -20.008 - - - -
(-2.99) (-3.91) - - - -
Time - - -0.094 -0.121 - -
- - (-2.32) (-3.10) - -
Cost - - - - -28.993 -30.476
- - - - (-2.46) (-3.13)
Period Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
N.Obs 98 98 98 98 98 98
Breusch Pagan Test 69.44 41.19 74.41 52.31 76.07 37.60
R2 0.903 0.87 0.888 0.852 0.886 0.858
(1) t-statistics in parenthesis.
21Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis. Dropping 1, 2 and 3 Countries at a Time(1)
Variable Minimum Maximum Regressions p < 0.5 Countries
Time -.150 -.101 18 100 17
Time -.239 -.096 153 100 16
Time -.290 -.129 816 96.2 15
Cost -41.5 -25.7 18 100 17
Cost -53.8 -28.0 153 99.3 16
Cost -59.7 -26.8 816 87.7 15
Cost/Time -24.2 -17.3 18 100 17
Cost/Time -28.8 -16.9 153 100 16
Cost/Time -32.6 -16.1 816 100 15
(1)Same speciﬁcation as in Table 3 including time eﬀects.
random eﬀects estimates of the determinants of the service employment share across 18
OECD countries. Note that Breusch-Pagan lagrange multiplier tests for random eﬀects
presented at the bottom of the table overwhelmingly suggest the presence of country
eﬀects in the data.
Note the strong negative and signiﬁcant relation between the relative strictness of
entry regulations and the share of service employment. This association is robust to
the indicator of entry restrictions considered and the introduction of a large set of con-
trols, and shows a stable magnitude across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. These results
are consistent with those discussed in Messina (2002) for a broader set of indicators of
product market regulations. For the purpose of illustration, the point estimate presented
in Column (1) suggests that if countries like Italy or Germany deregulated their prod-
uct markets to become as regulated as the US, their service employment share would
increase by more than 8 and almost 6 percentage points respectively. Eﬀects of similar
magnitude are found for the variables measuring the time spent in dealing with entry
regulations and the mixed indicator Time/Cost.
Concerning the other variables included in the regression, the expected positive as-
eﬀects and the covariates. An alternative that does not require this assumption is to estimate eq. (26) by
OLS and calculate robust to country clustering standard errors. The results regarding entry regulations,
available upon request, are qualitatively the same as those presented in the paper.
22sociation between the service employment share and GDP per capita is found in this
sample. The negative sign on the square of GDP per head points to a non-linear relation
between income per capita and the service employment share which, according to the
estimates of Column (1) suggests a turning point when income per capita reaches 19,911
$. This is below the ﬁgures of the richest countries in the last period of the sample, sug-
gesting that mature economies might have entered a saturation point in the expansion
of service employment.
There is evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant and positive association between the
size of the public sector and the service employment share. Similarly, the positive and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the degree of urbanization suggests that the development
of certain services (e.g. leisure and business services) is tightly associated with the con-
centration of the population in urban areas. The negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of union
density is also the expected, as the negative (although non-statistically signiﬁcant) role
of employment protection legislation. However, the suggested role for wage compres-
sion in cutting back low skilled service jobs is not supported by the positive (although
insigniﬁcant) coeﬃcient of wage-setting coordination.
Table 4 presents a sensitivity check with respect to the number of countries included in
the analysis. It repeats the regressions displayed on Table 3 dropping 1, 2 and 3 countries
at a time to assess the impact of particular sample compositions on the signiﬁcance of the
relationship between entry regulations and the service employment share. The results
conﬁrm that the negative association found is not due to a particular composition of
countries in the sample, but instead very robust to the countries included in the analysis.
The indicator of Time and the mixed Time/Cost measure of regulations are signiﬁcant in
more than 95 per cent of the regressions regardless the countries selected. Only the cost
of regulations becomes statistically insigniﬁcant in 12 per cent of the regressions when
draws dropping 3 countries are considered. Given the usual weakness of this type of
cross-country regressions and the limited sample size at hand, I consider this evidence as
supportive of the negative association between the service employment share and entry
regulations.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
The service sector is the main engine of employment creation in developed economies. In
spite of this wide-spread phenomenon, the dynamism of innovative service ﬁrms diﬀers
considerably across countries, and the lack of services jobs might be one of the sources
of poor employment performance in some European countries.
This paper develops a model in which barriers to entry interact with the sources
23of structural change (non-homotheticity of preferences and diﬀerences in productivity
growth across sectors) resulting in a shift of resources from the growing to the con-
tracting sectors. The model shows that economy-wide regulatory barriers to business
start-ups hamper the development of dynamic service industries with income elastic de-
mand. Empirical evidence presented in the paper supports this result, showing that
countries with more stringent barriers to entry have lower service employment shares.
These results are robust to the use of diﬀerent indicators of entry regulations and to
diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
The model additionally suggests a supply-side rationale for the cross-country neg-
ative association between entry regulations and employment rates previously found in
the literature. These institutions, by increasing rents and service prices might favor a
substitution of market activities by home production that reduces labour supply.
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